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A DEADLY CURE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
DANGEROUS MEDICINE IN FERGUSON V. CITY
OF CHARLESTON
GEORGE M. DERY HIT*
L Introduction
The United States Supreme Court, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,'
determined that its "special needs" doctrine could not support drug testing of
expectant mothers without their consen and that the practice thus violated the
Fourth Amendment Such a ruling seems hardly controversial given the
unsympathetic treatment shown to the mothers by local law enforcement. One
mother who visited the hospital with early contractions wound up jailed during the
remainder of her pregnancy, while the police "shackled and handcuffed" another
as she delivered her baby." No less an authority than the American Medical
Association urged that such drug testing, despite its intentions of protecting
children, might actually increase, not decrease, "the potential harm to unborn
infants."' Thus, Ferguson, in preventing the drug testing of expectant mothers, not
only aimed to protect Fourth Amendment boundaries, but also intended to prevent
misguided doctors from worsening their patients' health.
It is therefore ironic that the Ferguson Court, acting as a team of doctors
protecting the health of the Fourth Amendment, prescribed a cure that might
ultimately kill its patient. The irony is further compounded by the fact that the
initial disease afflicting the Fourth Amendment was itself iatrogenic' In the mid-
* Professor, California State University, Fullerton, Division of Political Science and Criminal
Justice; former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California. J.D., 1987, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles; B.A., 1983, University of California Los Angeles. I would like to thank my research assistant,
Mark Zubiate, B.A. 2002, Criminal Justice, California State University, Fullerton.
1. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 522 U.S. 67 (2001).
2. Id. at 84.
3. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Motion for Leave to File an Arnicus Curiae Brief and Brief of the NARAL Foundation et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12 n.6, Ferguson v, City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No.
99-936), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.conisupremecourt/biefs/99-936/99-936fo3/brief.pdf.
5. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae of the American
Medical Association in Support of Neither Party at 3, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)
(No. 99-936), available at http'J/supreme.1p.findlaw.con/supreme._court/briefs/99-936/99-936fo5/btief.pdf.
6. Webster's Dictionary defines "iatrogenic" as "induced inadvertently by a physician or surgeon or
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1980s, the Court determined that it was "impracticable" to measure the
reasonableness of certain government conduct, such as the enforcement of school
rules by public school teachers, by the Fourth Amendment's traditional warrant and
probable-cause protections.7 For such "exceptional circumstances," where the
government's interests went beyond "the normal need for law enforcement," the
Court grafted onto the Fourth Amendment a doctrine of its own invention -
"special needs."' As discussed below, special needs transplanted into Fourth
Amendment analysis a judicial balancing of the competing interests of the
government and the individual. This, in turn, enabled the Court's subjectivity, over
a series of decades, to infect Fourth Amendment fundamentals. Only recently have
the Justices become aware of the special needs contagion.' The Court's latest
efforts in Ferguson, however, instead of cleansing the Constitution of special
needs, have only created greater opportunity for the spread of infection.
This Article begins by reviewing the history of the special needs doctrine in Part
H. Part III presents Ferguson: its factual background, lower court rulings, and the
Supreme Court's own decision. Finally, in light of Ferguson, Part IV discusses the
new perils presented by the Court's latest strain of special needs.
II. Historical Background
A. New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The index Case of the "Special Needs" Infection
The special needs doctrine began as a germ of an idea so insignificant that it
initially failed to persuade a majority of the Court. Indeed, Justice Black was the
first to mention specifically "special needs" in a concurring opinion in New Jersey
v. T.L.O."' In T.L.O., a high school teacher caught T.L.O., a fourteen-year-old
freshman, and another student violating school rules by smoking in the girl's
bathroom." When the teacher reported the students to Assistant Vice Principal
Theodore Choplick, T.L.O.'s companion admitted to violating the school rule.'2
In contrast, T.L.O. not only denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory, but
"claimed that she did not smoke at all."" Mr. Choplick then searched T.L.O.'s
purse, finding cigarettes, marijuana, a pipe, and evidence of marijuana dealing."'
The vice principal turned the evidence over to police, and New Jersey pursued
delinquency charges against T.L.O. in court."
by medical treatment or diagnostic procedures." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 573
(10th ed. 1998).
7. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
8. Id.
9. See Chandler v: Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). In Chandler, the Court determined that drug
testing candidates for state office, even under the guise of special needs, was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 307.
10. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
II. Id. at 328.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 328-29.
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The war of wills between T.L.O. and her vice principal presented the U.S.
Supreme Court with an entirely new battlefield. No longer was the Court judging
the typical case of a police officer pursuing a criminal investigation; it now was
considering the actions of a school official trying to maintain school discipline in
order to foster the proper educational environment. Justice White, writing for the
Court, was aware of the important interests implicated on both sides of the case
in this unique setting. He declared that a school official's search of a student's
person or purse was "undoubtedly a severe violation" of privacy expectations."6
The Court further took care to explicitly announce that "there is no reason to
conclude that [students] have necessarily waived all rights to privacy" in items they
bring to school. 7 However, the T.L.O. Court was also fully cognizant that the
"substantial interest of the teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in
the classroom and on school grounds" required a "certain degree of flexibility in
school disciplinary procedures.""
Given the particular concerns presented in the campus setting, Justice White
asked, "How, then, should we strike the balance between the schoolchild's
legitimate expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to
maintain an environment in which learning can take place?" The answer came
from the same place as the problem: the "school setting."" The Court deemed the
"warrant requirement" to be "unsuited to the school environment."'" Likewise, the
"school setting" required "some modification of the level of suspicion," thus
diluting probable cause to some lower level of suspicion.' Justice White
explained, "Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests
suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard
of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt
such a standard."' Then, in place of Fourth Amendment fundamentals, the Court,
when considering the intrusion on a student's privacy, based legality "simply on
the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search."'2 The resulting
weighing of facts in T.LO. found Mr. Choplick's search of the purse to be
reasonable."5
It fell to Justice Blackmun to provide the doctrinal label to the Court's balancing
of interests. He argued that the Court had omitted a "crucial step" in abandoning
probable cause in favor of balancing of interests." Justice Blackmun wrote, "I
16. Id. at 337-38.
17. Id. at 339.
18. Id. at 339-40.
19. Id. at 340.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 340-41.
23. Id. at 341 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. I (1968); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 343-47.
26. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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believe that we have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly applying the
Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only when we were
confronted with 'a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility."'" Special
needs was to be truly special; this doctrine created a rarely used balancing test
employed in those extreme circumstances not foreseen by the Founders. Justice
Blackmun explained, "Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers."' Justice Blackmun identified the
special need in T.LO. as involving education. He noted,
education "is perhaps the most important function" of government, and
government has a heightened obligation to safeguard students whom
it compels to attend school. The special need for an immediate
response to behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren
and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court in
excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause re-
quirement, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the
relevant interests.2
The Court also balanced the interests in the State's favor in Griffin v. Wiscon-
sin," a case involving a much higher level of individual supervision than that
occurring in T.LO. In Griffin, a jury convicted the defendant of "possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon" based on evidence uncovered during a search of his
home by probation officers.3 Acting on a tip from a detective on the Beloit
Police Department that "there were or might be guns in Griffin's apartment,"
Michael Lew, a Probation Department supervisor, brought another probation officer
and three plainclothes police officers to Griffin's home." When Griffin answered
the door, Lew told him who they were and that they were going to search his
home.33 Rather than obtain a search warrant, the officers based their search
authority on Wisconsin's probation regulations?4 Wisconsin law deemed
probationers to be "in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and
Social Services and renderfed] them 'subject... to. . . conditions set by the court
and rules and regulations established by the department. '"'
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, categorized Griffin as a
special needs case. Specifically, Justice Scalia noted, "A State's operation of a
27. Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ.. 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
30. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
31. Id. at 871-72.
32. Id. at 871.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 870-71.
35. ld. at 870 (alterations in original) (quoting Wis. STAT. § 973.10(l) (1985-1986)).
[Vol. 55:373
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probation system, like its operation of a school, . . likewise presents 'special
needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual
warrant and probable-cause requirements.""' This departure was warranted in spite
of the fact that "[p]robation, like incarceration, is 'a form of criminal sanction.''"
In fact, the Court explicitly placed probation in the larger scheme of law
enforcement by characterizing it as "simply one point (or, more accurately, one set
of points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary
confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory
community service.""'
However, the Griffin Court did not stop its special needs analysis simply
because it characterized probation as part of law enforcement. Instead, it followed
a multidimensional approach, considering other purposes served by probation.
Probation, the Court noted, provided for "a period of genuine rehabilitation.""'
Indeed, the "more intensive supervision" caused an empirically measured decrease
in recidivism.' The restrictions of probationary supervision also ensured that the
"community is not harmed by the probationer's being at large."4 ' All of these aims
caused the Court to label "supervision" itself a "special need."'
Due to probation's special needs status, the Griffin Court rejected the warrant
requirement as interfering "to an appreciable degree with the probation system,
setting up a magistrate rather than the probation officer as the judge of how close
a supervision the probationer requires."'" Further, the delay of "obtaining a
warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to
evidence of misconduct," thus reducing the "deterrent effect" of any searches."
Justice Scalia also saw less need for a warrant to protect the probationer than for
"the ordinary citizen," for the probation officer had a unique relationship with the
probationer."' As the Court noted, "Although a probation officer is not an
impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer .... "' Instead, the probation
officer was a sort of hybrid, serving more than one master.'7 Justice Scalia
described a probation officer as "an employee of the State Department of Health
and Social Services who, while assuredly charged with protecting the public
interest, is also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer (who in
the regulations is called a 'client')." '
36. Id. at 873-74.
37. Id. at 874 (quoting GEORGE G. KILLINGER ET AL., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 14 (1976)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 875.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 876.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citation omitted). Included in the services a probation officer provides his client is
2002]
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Probation's supervisory relationship required not only dispensing with the
warrant, but also with probable cause.' Griffin determined that probable cause
"would reduce the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement" because an
officer would not be able to search his client so long as the "illegal (and perhaps
socially dangerous) activities were sufficiently concealed as to give rise to no more
than reasonable suspicion. "" In rejecting probable cause, the Court again
concerned itself with the interaction between probation officer and client. It noted,
"[W]e deal with a situation in which there is an ongoing supervisory relation-
ship - and one that is not, or at least not entirely, adversarial - between the
object of the search and the decisionmaker."'" Finally, in its concluding remarks
dispensing with probable cause, the Griffin Court singled out the heightened
interests of the government in combating contraband. Here, Justice Scalia offered,
"In some cases - especially those involving drugs or illegal weapons - the
probation agency must be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than
the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a
probationer does damage to himself or society. ""
B. The Special Needs Infection Invades the Privacy of the Human Body
The Court's next case employing special needs balancing extended government
intrusion from a search of a purse or an apartment to an exploration of fluids from
a person's body. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn, 3 the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) promulgated regulations regarding the testing of
biological samples from railroad operators." One regulation, "Subpart C,"5 '
mandated "blood and urine tests of employees who are involved in certain train
accidents."'  The second regulation, "Subpart D,"' permitted the railroads to
"administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules.""
The Railway Labor Executives' Association, and other labor organizations, sued
to enjoin the FRA's regulations."9
In its first consideration of the Fourth Amendment implications of toxicological
testing, the Court recognized that, "in most criminal cases," it favors "the
'individualized counseling designed to foster growth and development of the client as necessary."' Id.
(quoting Wis. ADMIN. CODE HSS § 328.04(2)(i) (1981)).
49. Id. at 878.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 879.
52. Id.
53. 489 U.S. 602 (1988).
54. Id. at 606.
55. 49 C.F.R. § 219.203 (1987).
56. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606; ; see a1so id. at 609. Examples include accidents resulting in a fatality,
the release of hazardous material and accompanying evacuation, and damage to railroad property of
$500,00 or more. Id. at 609 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(I) (1987)).
57. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301 (1987).
58. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606; see also id. at 611.
59. Id. at 612.
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procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.""'
However, Justice Kennedy, authoring the majority opinion, also noted that the
Court has made exceptions to the warrant and probable-cause mandates "when
'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable.'.'. Skinner echoed T.L.O. by announ-
cing that, in such cases, "we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and
privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause
requirements in the particular context. '
Accordingly, Justice Kennedy did not hesitate to employ special needs balancing
in Skinner. He likened the "[g]overnment's interest in regulating the conduct of
railroad employees to ensure safety" to its operation of schools or supervision of
probationers. 3 Railroads thus implicated .... special needs' beyond normal law
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
requirements."'" Railway employees engage in "safety sensitive tasks" and,
therefore, the legislation in this area was aimed at protecting "'life and proper-
ty."'" The FRA's toxicological tests were "not to assist in the prosecution of
employees, but rather 'to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that
result from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs."" Thus, the
government's interest in protecting the public and the employees themselves from
the dangers of combining drugs and trains required "'the exercise of supervision
to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed."'
6 7
Once the Court determined that the need for railway safety transported Skinner's
toxicological testing into the special needs realm, the Court then simply balanced
the competing interests to assess the practicability of the warrant and probable-
cause requirements. In the railroad context, warrants presented several problems."
Because the regular functioning of the human body eliminates "alcohol and other
drugs. . . from the bloodstream at a constant rate," the delay involved in procuring
a warrant could "result in the destruction of valuable evidence."' Further, the
government's reliance on private railroad personnel "to set the testing process in
motion" made the warrant mandate all the more unworkable.' "Railroad super-
visors, like school officials and hospital administrators, are not in the business of
investigating violations of the criminal laws or enforcing administrative codes, and
otherwise have little occasion to become familiar with the intricacies of this Court's
60. Id. at 619.
61. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 620.
64. Id. (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74).
65. Id. (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612, 619 (1911)).
66. Id. at 620-21 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 219.1(a) (1987)).
67. Id. at 621 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875).
68. Id. at 623.
69. Id.
70. Id.
2002]
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.""' Thus, the warrant requirement would hurt
more than help in the context of toxicological testing of railway employees.72
Probable cause fared even worse in Skinner than did the warrant requirement.
Warning that "a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor,"
the Court dispensed not only with probable cause, but with any level of suspicion
to support toxicological testing." Justice Kennedy declared,
In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the
search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a re-
quirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable
despite the absence of such suspicion. We believe this is true of the
intrusions in question here.'
Thus, to satisfy the terms of the Court's balancing test, the majority had to
consider Skinner's blood, breath, and urine intrusions to be "minimal." The blood
withdrawals satisfied this standard because their intrusion was "not significant,
since such 'tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical
examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted
is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk,
trauma, or pain."'7 5 Further, an employer could further mitigate a blood test's
intrusion by "'[having] blood ... taken by a physician in a hospital environment
according to accepted medical practices."'" The Skinner Court thus concluded that
"'[tihe blood test procedure has become a routine in our everyday life.""' Justice
Kennedy then deemed breath tests "even less intrusive" than blood tests, for among
other reasons, breath tests are conducted without piercing the skin.7
The urine tests presented the Court with "a more difficult question," for such
procedures required employees to "perform an excretory function traditionally
shielded by great privacy."' Interestingly, the Court found these intrusions to be
"minimal,"' in part, because of the "medical environment" in which the samples
were collected."' Indeed, Skinner characterized the urine tests as "not unlike
similar procedures encountered often in the context of a regular physical
examination. '
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 624.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 625 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
76. Id (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).
77. Id. (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 626.
80. Id. at 628.
81. Id. at 626.
82. Id. at 627.
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In contrast to the "limited threats" to an employee's "justifiable expectation of
privacy," the Skinner majority found the dangers to the government interests from
impaired railroaders to be significant. " Justice Kennedy warned, "Employees
subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that
even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.""' Thus,
government interest in monitoring "railroad employees engaged in safety-sensitive
tasks"" was an established necessity. Finally, because mandating any in-
dividualized suspicion in the wake of a train disaster would be "unrealistic, and
inimical to the Government's goal of ensuring safety in rail transportation,""' the
"[g]overnment interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion" was
"compelling."" Special needs thus enabled the Court, in balancing interests
regarding one of the "most private of activities,"" to discard not only the warrant
requirement, but also any protection of an individualized suspicion standard.
Justice Kennedy also wrote the majority opinion in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab" - the Court's next case involving drug testing of biological
samples. In Von Raab, a federal employee's union sued the United States Custom
Service for performing urinalysis of its employees." Specifically, the Customs
Commissioner required employees to submit to drug tests as a condition of
placement in positions involving drug interdiction, carrying of a firearm, or
handling classified material.'
At the outset in Von Raab, the Court noted that the case involved the "United
States Custom Service," which had the "important responsibility" of "interdiction
and seizure of contraband, including illegal drugs." 2 Von Raab emphasized that
"in 1987 alone, Customs agents seized drugs with a retail value of nearly $9
billion.""3 The Court then further highlighted the law enforcement role of the
Customs Service by offering the following:
In the routine discharge of their duties, many Customs employees have
direct contact with those who traffic in drugs for profit. Drug import
operations, often directed by sophisticated criminal syndicates, may be
effected by violence or threat. As a necessary response, many Customs
operatives carry and use firearms in connection with their official
duties."
83. Id. at 628.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 633.
86. Id. at 63 1.
87. Id. at 628.
88. Id. at 645 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
90. Id. at 663.
91. Id. at 660-61.
92. id. at 659-60.
93. d. at 660.
94. Id. (citation omitted).
2002]
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Despite the Customs Service's intensive law enforcement atmosphere, the Von
Raab Court still labeled the drug testing of these soldiers in the drug war as one
of the "special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enfor-
cement.' 5 Justice Kennedy concluded, "It is clear that the Customs Service's
drug-testing program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enfor-
cement."' The purpose of the toxicological tests was not to pursue "criminal
prosecution of the employee," but to "deter drug use among those eligible for
promotion to sensitive positions within the Service and to prevent the promotion
of drug users to those positions.""7
Once in the special needs context, Von Raab reiterated that it had become a
"longstanding principle that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any
measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of
reasonableness in every circumstance."'"' The Von Raab Court, accordingly,
dispensed with these Fourth Amendment fundamentals due to the balance of
interests in the case. The "'veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by
smuggling of illicit narcotics"" created a "compelling interest" for the govern-
ment to monitor its "front-line interdiction personnel."...
Against these "valid public interests," the Court weighed "the interference with
individual liberty that results from requiring these classes of employees to undergo
a urine test.'. After grudgingly recognizing that a drug screen's invasion of
privacy "could be substantial in some circumstances," Justice Kennedy countered
that "the 'operational realities of the workplace' may render entirely reasonable
certain work-related intrusions by supervisors and co-workers that might be viewed
as unreasonable in other contexts."' 2 Moreover, the Court considered it "plain"
that "certain forms of public employment may diminish privacy expectations," even
with respect to searches of the body."' Customs employees "who are directly
involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms"
are in such a form of public service and, therefore, "have a diminished expectation
of privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test.""'4 By virtue
of their very position, certain Customs employees "reasonably should expect" such
intrusions."' The balance of interests thus tilted in the government's favor,
making Von Raab's toxicological testing reasonable.""
95. Id. at 665.
96. Id. at 666.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 665.
99. Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez. 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
100. Id. at 670.
101. Id. at671.
102. Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Orega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 672.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 679.
[Vol. 55:373
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss3/3
THE SUPREME COURT'S DANGEROUS MEDICINE
Special needs made its farthest inroads into privacy in the Court's next case,
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton."' In Acton, faculty and administrators in
a school in the small logging town of Vernonia saw a sharp increase in discipline
problems, drug use, and drug-related accidents during the mid-1980s."' School
officials ultimately responded by mandating that every student wishing to
participate in school athletics must sign waivers authorizing two testing
procedures."" One procedure required urinalysis of all athletes at the start of each
season, without regard to the existence or absence of individualized suspicion of
drug use."" The next regime subjected students to random drug testing by having
10% of athletes provide a weekly urine sample."' For the random testing, a
student, under the supervision of an adult monitor of the same sex, would produce
a urine sample in an empty locker room."2 The monitor would station himself
about fifteen feet behind each male athlete, while the student produced the sample
at a urinal.' The monitor ensured the legitimacy of the sample by listening for
sounds of urination, checking the sample for temperature, and looking for signs of
tampering."4 The school similarly compelled female athletes to produce samples;
however, they were enclosed in bathroom stalls while providing the samples.'
The school did not prosecute students who tested positive."' Instead, any athlete
with two positive results could choose between attending an "assistance program"
that mandated weekly urinalysis or being suspended from athletics."'
The Acton Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, categorized the case
as one of "special needs.""'.. Interestingly, urinalysis testing triggered special
needs balancing at least in part because of the novelty of its intrusion. Justice
Scalia declared,
At least in a case such as this, where there was no clear practice, either
approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the
constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets
the reasonableness standard "'is judged by balancing its intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.""'
107. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
108. Id at 648.
109. Id. at 650.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. The Acton Court noted. "[Flinaily, the results of the tests are disclosed only to a limited class
of school personnel who have a need to know; and they are not turned over to law enforcement
authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function." Id. at 658.
117. Id. at 651.
118. Id. at 653.
119. Id. at 652-53 (footnote omitted) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n. 489 U.S. 602,
619 (1989)).
2002]
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He further explained that compulsory school legislation did not exist until
Massachusetts pioneered the movement in 1852.2" Moreover, "the drug problem,
and the technology of drug testing, are of course even more recent.'' Thus, by
inventing a new way to intrude upon privacy, such as the urinalysis in Acton, the
government could avoid the more stringent fundamentals of the Fourth Amendment
in favor of special needs balancing.
The balancing involved, however, was not simply balancing the government's
interests on the one hand against those of the individual on the other. Instead,
Acton crafted a complicated multiprong test.'2 Justice Scalia pigeonholed the
competing interests into three factors: "[I] the decreased expectation of privacy,
[2] the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and [31 the severity of the need met
by the search.""'
Acton's first factor, "the nature of the privacy interest" of the individual, varied
both with the "context" in which it is being asserted, and upon "the individual's
legal relationship with the State."' 24 Regarding the relevance of context, Justice
Scalia noted that the legitimacy of students' privacy expectations could be eroded
by their act of "going out for the team."" School sports were "not for the
bashful," as public locker rooms, where students "suit up" and shower, were "not
notable for the privacy they afford."" Rather, athletics exposed students to an
atmosphere of "communal undress."'
A person's relationship to the government could similarly harm privacy interests.
For instance, the State's "supervisory relationship" with the probationer "justifies
'a degree of impingement upon [a probationer's] privacy that would not be
constitutional if applied to the public at large." '1z Likewise, the government has
exercised a "custodial and tutelary" power over schoolchildren entrusted to its care,
which has required school officials to act, "for many purposes," as "in loco
parentis."'5
Applying Acton's second prong, which focused on the "character of the intrusion
that is complained of," the Court conceded that compelled urinalysis intruded upon
"'an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy.""' Despite this,
Justice Scalia equated the manner of obtaining the sample to a routine visit to the
restroom, thus making any traditional privacy shield unnecessary. 3' The
obtrusiveness of the search was also affected by the content of information it
120. Id. at 652 n.I.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 664-65.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 654.
125. lit at 657.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 654 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
129. Id. at 655.
130. Id. at 658 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)).
131. Id.
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discovered. 2 Justice Scalia considered it "significant that the tests at issue here
look only for drugs."'3 He then contrasted such a minimal invasion to the more
severe privacy breach of learning whether a person is pregnant." Finally, Acton
considered urinalysis to be "like routine school physicals and vaccinations," rather
than like evidentiary searches. 3 ' Such reasoning led the Court to label the
privacy intrusion of Vernonia's compelled urinalysis as "negligible"'36 and "not
significant."'' 7
Acton then assessed the severity of the need met by the search, breaking this
inquiry into a consideration of both the "nature and immediacy" of the relevant
governmental concern.'" Justice Scalia intoned that the importance of the
government's concern could "hardly be doubted," for it was nothing less than
"[dieterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren."'39 The Court emphasized
this point by specifying the health problems caused by drugs, particularly in
children." Justice Scalia worried,
School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drugs are most severe. "Maturing nervous systems
are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are;
childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound"; "children grow
chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of
recovery is depressingly poor."' 4'
The Acton Court delved still further into the clinical dangers of drugs, considering
such medical particulars as "heart rate increase," "vasoconstriction," and the
"inhibition of normal sweating responses."'4
2
The government's interest included not only the health of those students who
ingested the drugs, but other children under its care as well.' 3 The Court noted
that "the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but
upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is dis-
rupted."'" Compounding this concern was "the fact that this evil is being visited
not just upon individuals at large, but upon children for whom it has undertaken
a special responsibility of care and direction." These potential perils, combined
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 658 n.2.
136. Id. at 658.
137. Id. at 660.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 661.
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting Richard A. Hawley, The Bumpy Road to Drug-Free Schools, 72 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 310, 314 (1990)).
142. Id. at 662.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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with the immediacy of the government interest in quelling a student "rebellion"
fueled by drugs, as well as the efficacy of targeting athletes as the role models of
drug use," led the Court to conclude that the balance of interests tilted in the
direction of reasonableness."
C. The Court Belatedly Recognized Special Needs' Danger to Fourth
Amendment Privacy
Like a physician who suddenly discovers a medical emergency after having
negligently watched a patient's vital signs, the Court abruptly changed the course
of its special needs precedent in Chandler v. Miller.'" Unfortunately, as is
common in emergencies, the Chandler Court's actions seemed based more on
confused panic than on quiet reason. Chandler grew out of a Georgia statute that
required candidates for certain state offices, including governor, the attorney
general, and judges, to certify that they had taken and passed a drug test.'" In
1994, Walker L. Chandler, candidate for Lieutenant Governor, along with other
Libertarian Party nominees, filed suit in federal court, claiming that Georgia's drug-
testing requirement violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.'"0
The mandated testing was, in several ways, less intrusive than that previously
upheld in Acton. While the school administration in Acton compelled students to
urinate under the watchful eye of a faculty monitor, the candidates in Chandler
merely had to present a certificate reporting that they had "submitted to a
urinalysis test within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and the
results were negative."'.. Acton's students had no choice about where to perform
their urinalysis. In contrast, every candidate in Chandler could choose to provide
a specimen at a state-approved laboratory or at the office of a personal
physician." In Chandler, if the candidate suffered a positive result at the
doctor's office, he could simply prevent disclosure to any state official by not filing
the certificate. 3 Acton's urinalysis scheme failed to provide students with any
such "opt-out" choice.
The Court in Chandler, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, found that
Georgia's urinalysis requirement for candidates violated the Fourth Amendment.'"
Although it refused to expand special needs to include drug testing of political
candidates, Chandler still defended the doctrine's legitimacy. Indeed, Justice
146. Id. at 662-63.
147. Id. at 664-65.
148. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
149. Id. at 309-10.
150. Id. at 310.
151. Id. at 309.
152. Id. at 310.
153. Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1547 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). Justice
Ginsburg noted that the "results of the test are given first to the candidate, who controls further
dissemination of the report." Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
154. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308.
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Ginsburg raised the balancing approach to the exalted status of a constitutional
mandate, intoning, "When such 'special needs' - concerns other than crime
detection - are alleged in justification of Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts
must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private
and public interests advanced by the parties."'13
5
The Chandler Court then reviewed the competing concerns in the special needs
precedent. Skinner presented significant government interests because railroad
employees could "cause great human loss" even before supervisors could detect
signs of impairment." Von Raab concerned the U.S. Customs Office, a
government agency with an "almost unique mission" as the "first line of defense"
against importing drugs into the country."' In Acton, the government was
burdened with "large responsibilities" over the "children entrusted to its care."'3 6
Chandler, in contrast, simply lacked such concerns. An exasperated Justice
Ginsburg noted, "Nothing in the record hints that the hazards [the government]
broadly describe[s] are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity."'5 9
The Court searched in vain for a "demonstrated problem of drug abuse," which,
"while not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime, would shore
up an assertion of special need for a suspicionless general search program."'
Regarding the government's side of the balance, the need was "in short, symbolic,
not 'special,' as that term draws meaning from our case law.'''
When Chandler considered the candidates' privacy interests, it recalibrated its
balancing scales. Traditional special needs reasoning deemed that individuals
shrank their reasonable expectation of privacy by participating in settings involving
pervasive oversight." In Chandler, such constant scrutiny actually increased
privacy expectations from government intrusion. Justice Ginsburg reasoned that
because "[clandidates for public office... are subject to relentless scrutiny - by
their peers, the public, and the press," any government drug-testing program was
unnecessary." 3 Finally, Chandler criticized Georgia's drug-testing scheme for not
intruding enough; because the testing date was not secret, the state's legislative
scheme enabled drug abusers to cheat the system with temporary abstention.'"
The urinalysis was thus an ineffective, and therefore meaningless, intrusion into
individual rights.
The Chandler Court, acting as a doctor stunned by the sudden worsening of a
patient's condition, applied its special needs remedy in a rough and sloppy manner.
To the end, Chandler irrationally clung to the belief that the special needs doctrine
155. id at 314 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 315.
157. Id at 316.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 319.
160. Id. (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 322.
162. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
163. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
164. Id. at 319-20.
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was good medicine, reiterating that "where the risk to public safety is substantial
and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
,reasonable.""'  The Court therefore simply administered the same treatment in
a different, if unpredictable, manner. Such a failure came to foreshadow further
blunders in Ferguson.
11. Ferguson v. City of Charleston
A. Factual Background
In 1988, Charleston found itself enmeshed in a struggle to provide healthcare to
crack babies and their drug-addicted mothers." Specifically, the staff at the
Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC), a public hospital operated in
Charleston, "became concerned about an apparent increase in the use of cocaine by
patients who were receiving prenatal treatment.""7 Such alarm was part of a larger
national picture, in which both the public and the "medical community" worried
about an "epidemic" of "crack babies."'M
Crack use could create a number of "serious consequences for both maternal and
infant health. ' " Dangers to mothers included: "risk of premature delivery,
premature separation of the placenta (abruptio placentae), spontaneous abortion, and
death.""' Infants who were exposed to cocaine in the womb could suffer
increased risk of sudden death syndrome, low birth weight, seizures,
strokes, heart attacks, lack of bonding, emotional disorders, behavioral
problems, . . . learning disabilities . . . brain damage, prune belly
syndrome, limb reduction defects, kidney damage, and damage to the
genitourinary and reproductive systems.'
Moreover, even a single dose of crack cocaine could "kill the baby and the mother
too."'
In
Medical research indicated that the cocaine problem was widespread. One study
showed that "each year in South Carolina, alone, approximately 15,000 babies
suffered from prenatal exposure to illegal drugs.'17  In 3221 of these cases,
cocaine was the mother's drug of choice. Cocaine use during pregnancy had a
ripple effect far into the future of both the child and society. Crack babies increased
165. Id. at 323.
166. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 70 n.I.
169. See Brief for the Respondents City of Charleston at 4, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67 (2001) (No. 99-936) [hereinafter Respondent's Briefi, available at http://supreme.1p.findlaw.com/
supreme_court/briefs/99-936/99-936mo2/brief.pdf.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id.
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the need for neonatal intensive care, social services, foster care, and special
education services."' These children also suffered "lower levels of achievement
of educational and occupational goals, increased family stress, and reduced maternal
bonding.""'7 Charleston also gathered evidence that, in severe cases, "lifetime
economic costs [would be] in excess of $1 million per infant." 77
Charleston responded to these public health dangers by placing MUSC's
employees in the awkward position of treating some pregnant women both as
patients and as potential targets of criminal prosecution. In April 1989, MUSC
began drug screening maternity patients suspected of cocaine use.76 Due to
concerns about "the degree of discretion in allowing individual physicians to order
urine drug tests without any parameters," MUSC established "six criteria to control
the discretion.""' The hospital then referred patients who tested positive to the
County Substance Abuse Commission "for counseling and treatment."'"' This
policy proved ineffective in reducing the incidence of maternity patient cocaine
use," ' for virtually none of the patients that MUSC referred to the substance abuse
commission followed through with treatment."'
The case manager for MUSC's obstetrics department, nurse Shirley Brown, was
undaunted by the program's earlier failure." She had heard on the news that
"police in Greenville, South Carolina were arresting pregnant users of cocaine on
the theory that such use harmed the fetus and was therefore child abuse."'"
Nurse Brown further learned that, "under state law, prenatal cocaine use
constituted child abuse and neglect which the Medical Center was required to report
to law enforcement.""' 5 Nurse Brown discussed her concerns with MUSC's general
counsel, Joseph C. Good, Jr., who in turn offered the hospital's help to Charleston
Solicitor General Charles Condon in "prosecuting mothers whose children tested
positive for drugs at birth."'"" Good's letter spoke explicitly about fighting crime,
urging, "Please advise us if your office is anticipating future criminal action and
what if anything our Medical Center needs to do to assist you in this matter.""7
In response to MUSC's letter, Solicitor Condon formed a task force that included
representatives from "MUSC, the police, the County Substance Abuse Commission
and the Department of Social Services."'" The task force's stated objective was
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001).
179. Respondent's Brief at 5-6.
180. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70.
181. id.
182. Respondent's Brief at 6.
183. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70.
184. Id.
185. Respondent's Brief at 6.
186. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70-71.
187. Id. at 71 n.3.
188. Id. at 71. The city of Charleston viewed this as a "multidisciplinary task force ... consisting
of representatives from different agencies with varied interest% in formulating a solution." See
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to "maximize maternal-fetal health and protect children.""' The task force's
deliberations indicated that "this was not supposed to be a punitive policy where we
went out and punished people for doing something, even though we knew the
activity was illegal. What we were trying to do is give those babies a chance to be
born normal."'" Because the "voluntary referral" program failed, "the substance
abuse representative on the task force proposed 'the carrot and stick' method of
coercive treatment as a last resort in dealing with the problem.'" He explained
that such leverage was necessary to get the addict's attention, for most are "in such
a state of denial that they will not voluntarily seek help.""'
The result of the task force's deliberations was "Policy M-7" for "Management
of Drug Abuse During Pregnancy.""' Policy M-7 had three steps, only the last of
which involved law enforcement.'" In the first step, the hospital identified
pregnant patients who were abusing drugs.' The second step included providing
patients who tested positive with "educational information and referring [them] to
substance abuse counseling."'" In the third step, the hospital used "the threat of
law enforcement intervention" as "leverage" to get the "women into treatment and
keep[] them there.'""
The task force carefully crafted all three steps, however, with the potential of
criminal conviction in mind.'" In its first pages, Policy M-7 instructed hospital
staff on how to "identify/assist pregnant patients suspected of drug abuse."'"
These guidelines declared that the hospital should administer a urine drug screen for
cocaine to any patient meeting "one or more of nine criteria."' "' Such criteria were
Respondent's Brief at 6. Specifically, the city noted that MUSC's obstetrical and neonatology staff "had
a vital interest in maternal and infant health"; the Solicitor's Office and Police had "an interest in
protecting the infants and enforcing the laws governing illegal drug use and child abuse and neglect";
the Department of Social Services had an interest in "safeguarding the health and welfare for the infants";
and the County Substance Abuse Commission had an interest in "providing services for treatment of drug
abuse." Id. at 7.
189. Respondent's Brief at 7.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 8.
192. Id.
193. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71.
194. Respondent's Brief at 8.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 9.
197. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72.
198. Id. at 70-72.
199. Id. at71.
200. Id. In Ferguson. the Court listed the criteria as:
I. No prenatal care
2. Late prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation
3. Incomplete prenatal care
4. Abruptio placentae
5. Intrauterine fetal death
6. Preterm labor 'of no obvious cause'
7. IUGR [intrauterine growth retardation] 'of no obvious cause'
8. Previously known drug or alcohol abuse
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hardly unique to drug abuse. Indeed, several patients described problems or even
tragedies that might befall any unlucky parent, such as "preterm labor 'of no obvious
cause' or "intrauterine fetal death."" ' The hospital, however, treated the urine
samples as if they were potential evidence in later criminal proceedings, ensuring
that the hospital employees followed a chain of custody for the drug tests.2 ' Yet,
a positive test merely subjected a patient to "education and referral to a substance
abuse clinic."' 3 Only if the patient "failed to follow-up with substance abuse
treatment or prenatal visits, or if she tested positive a second time" would the police
ultimately arrest her.'
The hospital involved law enforcement according to "two protocols, the first
dealing with the identification of drug use during pregnancy and the second with
identification of drug use after labor."' Under the first protocol, if a pregnant
patient "tested positive for cocaine a second time or if she missed an appointment
with a substance abuse counselor," the hospital notified the police and the patient
was arrested.' Under the second protocol, should a patient test positive after her
labor, the hospital immediately notified the police and the patient was arrested. "
In 1990, at the suggestion of the Solicitor General, patients falling within the second
protocol could, like those in the first protocol, "avoid arrest by consenting to
substance abuse treatment.""
The actual arrests accorded little with the medical needs of the patients. As for
the mothers, "[viarious of them were shackled to their hospital beds, arrested shortly
before or immediately after giving birth, often while still dressed in hospital gowns
and still suffering pain and bleeding from the childbirth.""
Policy M-7 even described "in detail the precise offenses with which a woman
could be charged, depending on the stage of her pregnancy." "" For example,
If the pregnancy was 27 weeks or less, the patient was to be charged
with simple possession. If it was 28 weeks or more, she was to be
charged with possession and distribution to a person under the age of
18 - in this case, the fetus. If she delivered "while testing positive for
9. Unexplained congenital anomalies.
Id. at 71 n.4 (alteration in original).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 71-72.
203. Id. at 72.
204. Respondent's Brief at 9.
205. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Motion of the American Public Health Association, South Carolina Medical Association,
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Nurses Association, et al., for Leave
to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9, Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com-
supremecourtrbriefs/99-936199-936fo4/brief.pdf.
210. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72.
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illegal drugs," she was also to be charged with unlawful neglect of a
child."'
Ten women who were arrested under Policy M-7 filed suit against MUSC,
Charleston, and law enforcement officials "who helped develop and enforce the
policy." '212 Among other claims, the ten obstetrics patients urged that MUSC's
drug-testing policy violated the Fourth Amendment."'
B. Lower Court Rulings
At trial, the patients who had been arrested under MUSC's drug-testing regime
argued that the urine screens were unreasonable searches performed without their
consent."4 The defendants responded that the searches were consensual and, in
any event, were reasonable even absent consent in light of their "special non-law-
enforcement purposes.""1 5 The trial judge rejected the defense's special needs
characterization of the searches, for the searches "'were not done by the medical
university for independent purposes. [Instead,] the police came in and there was an
agreement reached that the positive screens would be shared with the police.' ' ' .
The district court did, however, submit the factual issue of consent to the jury,
which returned a verdict in favor of the defense."'
The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that "the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's consent finding.' 1' The Fourth
Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Wilkins, found it "unnecessary" to decide
the consent issue because the urine tests were reasonable as special needs
searches." 9 Judge Wilkins framed the issue as
[w]hether a balancing of MUSC's interest in protecting the health of
children whose mothers use cocaine during pregnancy, the effectiveness
of the policy to identify and treat women who use cocaine during
pregnancy, and the degree of intrusion experienced by women whose
urine was tested for evidence of cocaine use results in a conclusion that
the searches violated the Fourth Amendment.2
The court of appeals acknowledged the trial court's refusal to find that the
searches were reasonable under the special needs doctrine because "law enforcement
211. Id. at 72-73.
212. Id. at 73.
213. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1999),
214. id. at 476.
215. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73.
216. Id. at 73-74 (alteration in original) (quoting the district court).
217. Id. at 74. According to the court's instructions, "in order to find that the plaintiffs had
consented to the searches, it was necessary for the jury to find that they had consented to the taking of
the samples, to the testing for evidence of cocaine, and to the possible disclosure of the test results to
the police." Id. at 74 n.6.
218. Id. at 74.
219. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476.
220. Id. at 477.
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officers were involved in the formulation of the policy.""1 Yet, Judge Wilkins did
not find that law enforcement involvement was fatal to a special needs analysis. u2
In support of this view, the court of appeals relied on Michigan Department of State
Police v. Sit," a U.S. Supreme Court case where balancing upheld suspicionless
intrusions at sobriety checkpoints by "uniformed police officers."2 " Judge Wilkins
also noted the dissent's argument that the use of test results to support arrests of
patients precluded special needs balancing.' Here again, the court of appeals
found support for its own position in Supreme Court precedent. ' Judge Wilkins
relied on Griffin, which found a probation search "justified by the special needs of
the Wisconsin probation system even though evidence gathered during the search
was employed to support a criminal conviction."22 '
Thus, believing it would have the Supreme Court's blessing, the court of appeals
did not hesitate to weigh the competing interests under the special needs doctrine.
In considering the first factor of governmental need, Judge Wilkins noted that
Chandler required that the "hazard giving rise to the alleged special need must be
a concrete danger, not merely a hypothetical one."'m Charleston easily met this
standard, for "medical personnel at MUSC noticed an alarming increase in the
number of pregnancies affected by cocaine use," which was "associated with a
number of pregnancy complications."' Maternal cocaine abuse could even have
fatal consequences, for "[elven a single use of cocaine during pregnancy may result
in separation of the placenta from the uterine wall - a condition that may threaten
the life of the mother and the fetus - or a stroke in the fetus." ' Further, cocaine
use by pregnant mothers also had a substantial cost in public resources, as much as
$3 billion annually nationwide." Judge Wilkins therefore concluded that "MUSC
officials unquestionably possessed a substantial interest in taking steps to reduce
cocaine use by pregnant women.""
As to the second factor of effectiveness of the search, the court of appeals
understood that it was not to perform some intrusive analysis regarding the best use
of public resources; rather, it was merely to assess whether the search "'advances
the public interest."' 3 Here, Judge Wilkins determined that there could be "little
doubt" that Policy M-7's testing "was an effective way to identify and treat maternal
cocaine use while conserving the limited public resources of a public hospital."2'"
221. Id. at477 n.7.
222. Id.
223. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
224. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477 n.7.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. id. at 477.
229. Id. at 477-78.
230. Id. at 478.
231. id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (I 990)).
234. Id.
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Indeed, "[such] prenatal testing was the only effective means available to
accomplish the primary policy of persuading women to stop using cocaine during
their pregnancies" in order to protect their fetuses."
For the final factor, the degree of intrusion, the court of appeals recognized that,
in general, "the privacy interests implicated by the collection and testing of urine
are not minimal." ' Skinner, however, had taught that a search's context could
diminish a privacy intrusion. 3 In Ferguson, the hospital tested patients' urine "in
the course of medical treatment" where providing a sample is "normal" and
"routine." 3 ' Thus, the intrusion created by urinalysis was "minimal.""23 Because
the magnitude of the government interest and the effectiveness of its program
outweighed this minimal intrusion on patient privacy, the court of appeals found that
the drug tests were "reasonable and thus not violative of the Fourth
Amendment."'
C. The Court's Opinion
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, immediately
diagnosed Ferguson's problem as one of government intent. Justice Stevens framed
the issue as, "whether a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain
evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an
unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure."' As for
the conclusion that the hospital performed the tests without patient permission, the
Court made this assumption based on the "posture" of the case. The Ferguson Court
reasoned that "[b]ecause the Court of Appeals did not discuss this issue, . . . it
[was] more prudent to allow that court to resolve the legal and factual issues in the
first instance .... .2
The practical effect of Ferguson's deference to the court of appeals' lack of
action, however, was to treat consent as unproven, and therefore nonexistent. This
was a particularly curious outcome in light of the fact that the trial jury had made
a factual ruling on the issue of consent. Indeed, in the trial court, the jury who
heard the evidence first hand, and thus was in the best position to assess the facts,
found that the patients consented to "the taking of samples, to the testing for
evidence of cocaine, and to the possible disclosure of the test results to police.""4 3
Further, the court of appeals neither rejected nor even questioned this jury
finding. ' Instead, it simply found the consent issue "unnecessary to address," for
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 479.
237. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n. 489 U.S. 602, 618-24 (1989).
238. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69-70 (2001) (emphasis added).
242. Id. at 77 n. 1.
243. Id. at 74 n.6.
244. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476.
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it decided the case on the separate grounds of special needs."4 Thus, Justice
Stevens refused to recognize consent in this case in deference to a decision never
actually made by the court of appeals and in defiance of a finding made by a jury
best placed to determine the facts.
Regardless of its shaky foundation, the lack of consent assumption provided the
Court's first rationale to label Ferguson as different from other special needs
precedent. Justice Stevens intoned,
Because the hospital seeks to justify its authority to conduct drug tests
and to turn the results over to law enforcement agents without the
knowledge or consent of the patients, this case differs from the four
previous cases [Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia, and Chandler] in which
we have considered whether comparable drug tests "fit within the
closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches."'
The Ferguson Court noted that "[i]n the previous four cases, there was no
misunderstanding about the purpose of the test or the potential use of the test
results, and there were protections against the dissemination of the results to third
parties.""24 In contrast, the Court found that each patient in Ferguson had a
reasonable expectation of privacy that the hospital would not share the results of her
hospital test "with nonmedical personnel without her consent. ' "
Perhaps recognizing the fragility of the "no consent" distinction, Justice Stevens
offered a second distinction between Ferguson and prior special needs case law.
Here, the Ferguson Court urged that "[tihe critical difference between those four
drug-testing cases and this one, however, lies in the nature of the 'special need'
asserted as justification for the warrantless searches."" -The special need jus-
tification in each earlier case was "divorced from the State's general interest in law
enforcement.""0 In contrast, in Ferguson, "the central and indispensable feature
of the [government's] policy . . . was the use of law enforcement to coerce the
patients into substance abuse treatment." '
The resulting discussion of the critical difference became a strained exercise in
differentiating between the various kinds of purposes thought relevant by the Court.
Justice Stevens noted that "[ujnder our precedents, if there was a proper governmen-
tal purpose other than law enforcement, there was a 'special need,' and the Fourth
Amendment then required the familiar balancing between that interest and the
individual's privacy interest.' '22 Only certain purposes, however, were pertinent to
the Court's analysis. The city officials contended that their "ultimate purpose -
245. Id.
246. Ferguson. 532 U.S. at 77 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997)).
247. Id. at 78.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 79.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 80.
252. Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 325 (1997) (Rehnquist, CJ.. dissenting)).
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namely, protecting the health of both mother and child - is a beneficent one."' 3
The Ferguson Court rejected this "ultimate goal" as an irrelevant purpose, for "law
enforcement involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objec-
tive."' Therefore, the "ultimate purpose" formulation could sweep so broadly that
it would immunize "virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless purpose."'" Justice
Stevens instead ferreted out the government's "direct and primary purpose" or its
"immediate objective" as the Court's determinative standard." Ferguson assessed
the primary purpose, however, in the context of looking at the overall "progra-
mmatic purpose." ' In an attempt to explain, Justice Stevens offered this opaque
statement, "In looking to the programmatic purpose, we consider all the available
evidence in order to determine the relevant primary purpose." ''
In applying its new test of government purpose, the Court found Charleston's
purposes unavailing. Ferguson concluded that "[w]hile the ultimate goal of the
program may well have been to get the women in question into substance abuse
treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was to generate
evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal." ' In short, no
matter how noble, the ends could not justify the means. Justice Stevens noted that
"[tihe threat of law enforcement may ultimately have been intended as a means to
an end, but the direct and primary purpose of MUSC's policy was to ensure the use
of those means."'" Charleston's means, or "primary purpose[,] . . . was to use the
threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force women into treatment," thus
causing the urinalysis program to fall outside of special needs precedent."
Ferguson, hoping to reign in its special needs treatment, therefore added an entirely
new element to the Court's balance: the divination of officialdom's primary purpose.
IV. Potential Dangers of Ferguson's Proposed Remedy
A. The Ferguson Court Failed to Heed Its Own Special Needs Precedent, Creating
Further Confusion Regarding How to Balance the Competing Interests
In holding that Ferguson did not involve special needs, the Court distinguished
the drug testing of expectant mothers from that of railroad workers, Customs
Service employees, and students. Finding that MUSC's drug testing violated the
Fourth Amendment provided the Court no other option, for the weight of the prior
special needs cases actually supported toxicological testing of expectant mothers.
In short, the Ferguson Court simply did not balance the interests as it had in the
earlier special needs cases. Such unacknowledged abandonment of the earlier
253. Id. at 81.
254. Id. at 82, 84.
255. Id. at 84.
256. Id. at 83-84.
257. Id. at 81.
258. Id
259. Id. at 82-83 (footnote omitted).
260. Id. at 83-84.
261. ld. at 84.
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balancing approach created an unexplained inconsistency that will bewilder future
governmental actors.
In Skinner, the railroad employee case, the Court minimized the individual
intrusion occasioned by toxicological testing. When considering blood tests, Justice
Kennedy deemed the resulting invasion as "not significant, since such tests are a
commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations."' 2' The blood test,
being 'safe, painless, and commonplace,"' had become "'routine in our everyday
life.""'' 3 While Skinner recognized that urine tests presented a "more difficult
question"' because they required the performance of "an excretory function
traditionally shielded by great privacy," 5 Justice Kennedy again found solace in
the fact that the samples were akin to "a regular physical examination."2 Skinner
also found the fact that the urinalysis was performed in a "medical environment" to
be a mitigating factor."6 Finally, railroaders' expectations of privacy were
diminished by the context in which they worked. As employees in "an industry that
is regulated pervasively to ensure safety," railroad personnel had diminished privacy
expectations.'
Ferguson's drug testing of expectant mothers might be seen quite differently when
viewed through Skinner's lens. A urinalysis test, when considered in the larger
context of an obstetric exam or labor itself, hardly seems to be the largest of
intrusions on the patient's privacy. When juxtaposed to the contractions of labor,
known to cause sometimes life-threatening complications and generally recognized
to cause severe pain, a urinalysis test certainly seems "safe" and "painless."
Additionally, even though urination is traditionally shielded in privacy, in the
context of a hospital, where patients suffer the indignities of pelvic exams, bedpans,
and hospital gowns that open in the back, the privacy intrusion of a urinalysis test
seems small indeed. If the Skinner Court was assured that its similarity to a
physical examination and its occurrence in a "medical environment" lessened
urinalysis' intrusion, MUSC's urine tests, which were actual physical exams and
occurred in hospitals, should place the Court at even greater ease. Skinner
considered toxicological testing, such as a blood test, to be "routine in our everyday
life." If this was true for a railroad employee working on tracks, it should be
even truer for a pregnant patient receiving care at a hospital.
On the other side of the scale, Skinner seemed quite solicitous to the
government's concerns. A railroad employee's duties were so "fraught with such
risks of injury to others" that the Court worried "even a momentary lapse of
262. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989).
263. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983); Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
432, 436 (1957)).
264. id. at 626.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 627.
267. Id. at 626.
268. Id. at 627.
269. Id. at 625.
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attention can have disastrous consequences.""' Justice Kennedy further warned,
"Much like persons who have routine access to dangerous nuclear power facilities,
employees who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations can cause great
human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or
others. ' '2 1 In fact, an impaired employee would "seldom display any outward signs
detectable by .. . even the physician."2"' Applying this analysis to drug-addicted
mothers, it could be argued that doctors might miss the risks of harm to children
growing in the womb just as they missed risks of injury to others caused by
impaired railroaders. Indeed, while mothers may manifest no outward symptoms of
impairment, each contraction of her heart could be sending drugs through the
placenta to her baby.
Ferguson's weighing of interests also ran counter to the balancing applied in Von
Raab. When assessing Von Raab's individual privacy interests, Justice Kennedy
minimized the government's intrusion by considering the urinalysis in the greater
context of diminished privacy expectations."' Although urinalysis could cause
"substantial" privacy interference in "some circumstances," Von Raab viewed the
intrusion in light of the "operational realities of the workplace" of the Customs
Service.7 Working as an officer with Customs was hardly the typical job;
employees with the Service could expect routinely to come into contact with
"sophisticated criminal syndicates," resulting in exposure to drugs and violence.7
Thus, by joining this form of "public employment," such personnel should expect
"intrusive inquiries into their physical fitness for those special positions."27' These
Customs officers, therefore, had a "diminished expectation of privacy in respect to
the intrusions occasioned by a urine test."2" Again, what was true for Customs
employees should be more so for maternity patients. For maternity patients, going
to the hospital is an exercise in reconciling oneself to being continually poked and
prodded. Most expectant mothers would probably gladly trade the intrusions
occasioning amniocentesis" ' or a cesarean section" for that of a urine test.
Indeed, maternity patients undergo the most extreme of privacy intrusions. For
instance, the goal of some prenatal testing is to divine a person's own genetic
information to determine if the parent is a carrier of certain conditions."m If certain
270. Id. at 628.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Rab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 660.
276. Id. at 671.
277. Id. at 672.
278. Amniocentesis is "[tihe most commonly performed technique for prenatal diagnosis." MERCK
MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1845 (Robert Berkow et al. eds., 16th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
MERCK MANUAL]. This procedure involves the insertion of "a 20- or 22-gauge spinal needle" that is
"passed transabdominally into the amniotic fluid," causing the collection of "20 to 30 ml of fluid" from
the mother. Id.
279. Cesarean section is "surgical delivery by incision in the body of the uterus." Id.
280. Genetic screening includes tests for carriers of Sickle Cell Anemia and Tay-Sachs disease. Id.
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Customs officers "reasonably can expect effective inquiry into their fitness and
probity,"'" expectant mothers reasonably can expect a multitude of extreme and
uncomfortable privacy intrusions. In the context of an expecting mother, the
intrusion of one drug test might seem relatively minor indeed.
In weighing the government's interests, the Court in Von Raab was as deferential
to the needs of the State as it was in Skinner. With no reference to empirical
studies, Von Raab simply accepted the existence of a "'veritable national crisis in
law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics."'2" Furthermore, the
Customs Service, being "our Nation's first line of defense against one of the greatest
problems affecting the health and welfare of our population,"' 3 was exposed to the
violence and temptations growing out of this drug war.' It was thus "readily
apparent" to the Court that the government had a "compelling interest" in the
urinalysis program." Turning to Ferguson, it could be argued that the only
national crisis more pressing than the smuggling of illegal drugs into our nation
would be the crisis caused by the entry of drugs into our citizens. In Ferguson, the
national crisis was even more dire because not only were mothers ingesting drugs,
but fetuses, a group of drug users who never even consented to receive drugs, were
ingesting them as well. If drugs meant for use by adults threatened the nation's
"health and welfare," then such drugs posed an even more fundamental and longer-
term threat when directed toward a future generation.
Perhaps the most awkward case for the Ferguson Court was Acton. In this case,
Justice Scalia crafted a densely packed balancing test to assess the competing
interests in a special needs case.' Instead of simply balancing the interests of
both sides, Acton created three factors: "[i] the decreased expectation of privacy,
[2] the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and [3] the severity of the need met
by the search."'" Acton refined this complicated balancing test still further. The
Court divided the first factor of privacy expectation into an inquiry of: (a) "context"
in which the individual asserted the privacy interest; and (b) the "individual's legal
relationship with the State."' Acton broke the second factor, assessing the
intrusion occasioned by the search, likewise into two parts: (a) the "manner" of the
search; and (b) the "content of information" revealed by the search.' The Court
also divided the third prong of Acton's test, "the severity of the need met by the
search," into three queries: (a) the "nature.. .of the governmental concern;" (b) the
"immediacy of the governmental concern;" and (c) the "efficacy of this means for
at 1839. Genetic testing also exists for the fetus. Id. at 1840.
281. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672.
282. Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 669.
285. Id. at 670.
286. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 654.
289. Id. at 658.
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meeting" the governmental concern.' Thus, the Acton Court expanded its test
beyond the interests of government versus the individual, into a three-factor test,
which further included seven subparts.
A review of Acton's actual application of its complex test to its facts causes the
case to become even more relevant to Ferguson. Justice Scalia, weighing the Acton
test's first factor, considered the expectation of privacy asserted by the individual,
here student athletes."' Because this factor's first consideration was the "context"
in which the individual asserted the right, Acton reviewed the world of the student
playing on a school sports team. 2 Justice Scalia determined that school football
players had little legitimate privacy expectations, for "[sichool sports are not for the
bashful. They require 'suiting up' before each practice or event, and showering and
changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities,
are not notable for the privacy they afford.""3
Likewise, delivery of a child is hardly for the bashful. It requires patients to be
in varying states of undress and to allow parts of their body, which are typically
shielded by great privacy, ' to be open to view often to a variety of doctors,
nurses, and other hospital personnel. Expectant mothers often are called upon to
expose private facts that are not just skin deep; a common test is the ultrasound,
which enables medical staff to look inside the patient at the fetus in her womb."5
Further, patients expose not only their persons, but their pain and vulnerability as
they experience, often for several hours, one of life's most challenging events. The
delivery rooms of hospitals, often shared by more than one patient and protected by
a thin screen pulled around the bed, can make locker rooms, where people expose
only their skin for a matter of a few minutes, seem secure and private.
Acton also considered how the person's relationship with the State affected
privacy expectations. Here, Justice Scalia stretched the school's duty to properly
supervise students to cover his conclusion that "school authorities," for many
purposes, "'ac[t] in loco parentis."'" Acton included in the school's "custodial and
tutelary responsibility for children," which authorities exercised "[flor [the students']
own good and that of their classmates," physical examinations and vaccinations. 7
Such medical practices included checks of hearing, vision, and skin." Thus, Acton
found medical invasions on student privacy to be not only reasonable, but to justify
the further intrusion of urinalysis. The Court reached this conclusion even though
such medical procedures arguably were not part of the core role of school as
institutions of learning.
290. Id. at 660.
291. id. at 655, 657.
292. Id. at 657.
293. Id.
294. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989).
295. MERCK MANUAL, supra note 278, at 1854-55.
296. Acton, 515 U.S. at 655 (alteration in original) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 684 (1986)).
297. Id. at 656.
298. Id.
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Acton's "relationship with the State" rationale would seem all the stronger when
applied to a setting where the connection between individual and government is
truly a medical one. When maternity patients came to MUSC's obstetrics ward, they
rightly expected the county doctors to take all reasonable efforts within their means
to deliver a healthy baby from a healthy mother. Indeed, any shirking of this duty
could be grounds for malpractice. Because evidence at the time of MUSC's program
indicated that illegal drugs could harm fetal and maternal health, as well as
complicate delivery, doctors would be duty-bound to determine the presence of such
toxins. Hence, a urinalysis screen for drugs would fit squarely among the actions
taken in this particular relationship with the State.
Further, once the hospital detected drugs, one would not expect doctors to sit on
their hands. Alerted to the existence of the dangerous substances, doctors would
alter treatment of baby and mother accordingly. It could reasonably be foreseen that
such medical procedures, from the test to the resulting reactions in treatment, would
not be free of charge. Thus, the hospital would route the resulting documentation
to an insurer or to the relevant government officials. According to the Court itself,
voluntarily turning over such information to third parties diminishes the reasonable
expectation of privacy.'
Charleston's hospital officials would also do well under Acton's second factor, the
unobtrusiveness of the search. Acton found that the school's urinalysis program
barely registered on its first measure of obtrusiveness, the manner of intrusion.''
Equating faculty monitoring of urine samples to students' typical experience every
time they used the restroom, Justice Scalia found any privacy interests implicated
to be "negligible...'.. The same could be said of a patient providing a urine sample
in a hospital. A maternity patient, with bigger things on her mind, might consider
one biological sample to be no different from the myriad of other tests.
Regarding obtrusiveness, Acton continued, "The other privacy-invasive aspect of
urinalysis is, of course, the information it discloses concerning the state of the
subject's body, and the materials he has ingested."" Here, ironically, Justice
Scalia contrasted the school's screens, which looked "only for drugs," with more
intrusive tests, such as those that determined if a person was pregnant.3 With the
importance the Court has placed on context, a straightforward look at urinalysis of
maternity patients, where the bigger secret of pregnancy is already out of the bag,
would deem such invasions, in the unique circumstances of a hospital, as similarly
negligible.
Finally, in applying its third factor of severity of government need, Acton first
weighed the nature of this concern.' Labeling it as "[d]eterring drug use by our
Nation's schoolchildren," Justice Scalia urged that this interest was "important,
299. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1978).
300. Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 660.
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indeed - compelling."" When turning to the nature of the government's need in
Ferguson, the Court could adopt Justice Scalia's phrasing with little editing. The
government could claim essentially the same interest as that in Acton, save the fact
that the children are not of school age but are fetuses, and thus any harm from
drugs would start much earlier. Further, on top of the danger to children, Ferguson
possessed yet another concern - the impact of drug use on the health of the
mother.
However, even more important to Ferguson regarding Acton's nature-of-
governmental-concern analysis would be its reliance on medical evidence to support
the urine testing of children. In Acton, Justice Scalia took on the jargon of doctors,
speaking of "peripheral vasoconstriction," "masking of the normal fatigue response,"
and "myocardial infarction."" Perhaps in an effort to add the weight of medical
judgment to its conclusions, Acton also cited medical journals for support, such as
Clinical Pediatrics and Archives of General Psychiatry?" As a result, Justice
Scalia's analysis turned downright clinical:
School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drugs are most severe. "Maturing nervous systems
are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are;
childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound"; "children grow
chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of
recovery is depressingly poor. '
In its Ferguson briefs, the government urged that maternal drug abuse could
similarly have long-lasting effects on mothers, including "[inlcreased risk of
premature delivery, premature separation of the placenta (abruptio placentae),
spontaneous abortion, and death."" Medical consequences for the infant were just
as dire, including "increased risk of sudden death syndrome, low birth weight,
seizures, strokes, heart attacks . ..brain damage, prune belly syndrome, limb
reduction defects [and] kidney damage..... Ferguson's outcomes were thus at least
as "profound" as those facing the children in Acton. Indeed, Ferguson's fetuses were
even more vulnerable than Acton's athletes, for the children born at MUSC had just
been delivered from the womb of a drug-addicted mother, and therefore had no
escape from an environment literally filled with drugs. In contrast, the students in
Acton were exposed to counterbalancing positive influences of teachers and family.
Further, Justice Scalia's worry of "lifelong" impact would be even stronger in
Ferguson, where the infants are just starting their lives, and so the time of "lifelong"
is truly of greater duration. Finally, fetuses are not nearly as developed as
schoolchildren, and therefore Justice Scalia's concern that "maturing nervous
305. Id at 661.
306. Id. at 662.
307. Id. at 661-62.
308. Id. at 661 (quoting Hawley, supra note 141, at 314).
309. Respondent's Brief at 4.
310. Id.
[Vol. 55:373
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss3/3
THE SUPREME COURT'S DANGEROUS MEDICINE
systems are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones"3" has even
more weight in Ferguson than it did in Acton.
Acton had further intoned that weighing the severity of government need also
necessitated a review of the immediacy of the government interest."2 In Acton,
Justice Scalia deemed the immediacy element satisfied by the trial court's finding
that Vernonia was besieged by a "'state of rebellion" where .'[d]isciplinary actions
had reached 'epidemic proportions....3 3 When this analysis is moved from Acton
to Ferguson, the "epidemic" moves from metaphor to reality. Ferguson involved an
epidemic in the literal sense, for one study calculated that "each year in South
Carolina, alone, approximately 15,000 babies suffered from prenatal exposure to
illegal drugs."3"" The Supreme Court itself has long identified drug addiction as
a medical problem, explicitly declaring that "narcotic addiction is an illness" and
that addicts "'are diseased and proper subjects of [medical] treatment.' 315
Thus, who would be better placed to determine the immediacy of the medical
dangers posed by drugs than physicians themselves? Ferguson itself conceded that
MUSC, in implementing the urinalysis program, had the "beneficent" purpose of
"protecting the health of mother and child" ' and that the staffs "motive was
benign rather than punitive."3" Despite this, Justice Stevens gave the medical
experts no heed. This is curious, in light of the fact that the Ferguson Court had
elsewhere deferred the resolution of factual issues to those closer to the particular
circumstances of the case than itself. '"
Ferguson's refusal to consider the findings of those on the front line of the drug
war becomes ever more mysterious when it is contrasted with the Court's treatment
of "immediacy" findings in prior cases. In Skinner, the Court upheld drug testing
"based on findings of drug use by railroad employees nationwide, without proof that
a problem existed on the particular railroads whose employees were subject to the
test. 3.. In Von Raab, the Court was even more generous to the government,
allowing urinalysis despite the fact that "there was no documented history of drug
use by any customs officials."'"' Yet in Ferguson, where the danger of drug abuse
moved far beyond the hypothetical to target actual individual patients, the Court no
longer supported testing.
311. Acton, 551 U.S. at 661.
312. Id. at 660.
313. Id. at 662-63 (alteration in original) (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp.
1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992), vacated by 515 U.S. 646 (1995)).
314. Respondent's Brief at 5.
315. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,667 & n.8 (1962) (alteration in original) (quoting Linder
v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)).
316. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001).
317. Id. at 85.
318. Id. at 77 n.l1.
319. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 607 (1989)).
320. Id. (citing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673 (1989); id. at 683
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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The final piece of the Acton balancing test concerned the efficacy of the
government program. Here, Justice Scalia was satisfied to simply surmise that
testing would solve the school's drug problem by ensuring that the athletes, who had
a "role model" effect on the rest of the student body, "do not use drugs."'3 ' In
contrast, the MUSC staff in Ferguson moved beyond speculation of effectiveness
to deliver hard numbers. The city of Charleston noted,
Of the 253 patients who tested positive during the relevant time period,
only thirty failed to complete treatment or tested positive a second time
and consequently, were arrested. Of those thirty, most were processed
through pretrial intervention upon voluntary completion of substance
abuse treatment. Only two - neither of whom is a Petitioner - failed
to complete treatment and were prosecuted, but even they were ordered
to complete treatment as a condition of probation rather than sentenced
to an active jail term."
Charleston reinforced these numbers with individual testimonials:
After implementation of the Policy, the medical staff experienced a
decline in the number of positive drugs screens and fewer medical
complications previously attributed to cocaine abuse. The substance
abuse counselors reported that many of the patients referred by MUSC
benefitted from and successfully completed the treatment. Even many
of the Petitioners themselves admitted that the Policy helped them
successfully complete treatment and fight their addictions.'
Even Chandler, a case rejecting special needs drug testing, offers Ferguson little
support for its own refusal to extend special needs to expectant mothers in light of
the specific reasons the Chandler Court advanced to distinguish Georgia's urinalysis
program from the other special needs precedent. Chandler offered essentially three
reasons why drug urinalysis of candidates fell outside of special needs balancing.
None of Chandler's three arguments, however, remove Ferguson from special needs'
reach.
Indeed, Chandler's three arguments actually militate in favor of categorizing
Ferguson as a special needs case. The Court's first concern in Chandler was
Georgia's failure to identify any "fear or suspicion of drug use by state of-
ficials. 3u Justice Ginsburg declared, "Notably lacking in respondents' presentation
321. Id.
322. Respondent's Brief at 10.
323. Id. at 9-10. The city also aimed to ally fears that the program would discourage mothers from
coming to the hospital for treatment. It noted,
Contrary to the Petitioners' supposition, there was no evidence that the Policy discouraged
pregnant women from seeking treatment at the Medical Center. The MUSC data did not
demonstrate any change in the utilization patterns of their prenatal clinics nor did they
identify any increase in unbooked deliveries at other regional hospitals.
Id. at 10.
324. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997).
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is any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth
Amendment's main rule. Nothing in the record hints that the hazards respondents
broadly describe are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity." ' In
acknowledging Von Raab's lack of evidence directly demonstrating agent drug
abuse, however, Chandler did hedge that a "demonstrated problem of drug abuse"
was "not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime."'2 " Still, the
Court disparaged any attempt to justify special needs based solely on the need to
"set a good example."' Justice Ginsburg thus concluded that Georgia's need was
"symbolic, not 'special,' as that term draws meaning from our case law.0 2"
Ferguson, in contrast, hardly faced an empty threat of maternal drug use. It was
uncontested that MUSC routinely treated mothers who were addicted to drugs. 3"
Moreover, it would seem that the Ferguson Court itself would hesitate to
characterize Charleston's program as merely symbolic. Instead, Justice Stevens
criticized Ferguson's drug program for its very real impact, where Charleston
employed law enforcement as leverage to "coerce patients into substance abuse
treatment.
'330
Chandler's second argument distinguishing Georgia's drug urinalysis from
previous schemes concerned the efficacy of the State's testing regime.33' Justice
Ginsburg worried that the test date was "no secret," enabling candidates to "abstain
for a pretest period sufficient to avoid detection." ' The Chandler Court therefore
reasoned that "Georgia's certification requirement is not well designed to identify
candidates who violate antidrug laws. Nor is the scheme a credible means to deter
illicit drug users from seeking election to state office. '33  Such worries could
hardly apply to Ferguson. For hard evidence of actual identification of drug
abusers, one need look no further than the court of appeal's opinion. In Ferguson
v. City of Charleston, Circuit Judge Wilkins dutifully listed the plaintiffs' test
results,3 ' and the listed mothers either tested positive for cocaine or gave birth to
babies who did.33 Further, the testing resulted in "a decline in the number of
positive drug screens and fewer medical complications previously attributed to
cocaine abuse. ' ' Thus, unlike Georgia's officials, those in Charleston could argue
325. id. at 318-19.
326. Id. at 319. Later in its opinion, the Chandler Court explicitly accepted that, in Von Raab, there
was an "absence of any documented drug use problem among Service employees." Id. at 320.
327. Id. at 322.
328. Id.
329. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 485-86 (4th Cir. 1999).
330. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80 (2001).
331. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
332. Id. at 319-20.
333. Id. at 319.
334. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 485-86.
335. Those specifically listed as testing positive were Sandra Powell, Lori Griffin, Laverne
Singleton, Paula Hale, Pamela Pear, Theresa Joseph, Crystal Ferguson, Patricia Williams, and Darlene
Nicholson. Id. Although Ellen Knight tested negative, her child tested positive. Id. at 485.
336. Respondent's Brief at 10.
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that Ferguson's Policy M-7 demonstrated its effectiveness not only in identifying
drug users, but in deterring use by future patients.
Chandles third feature distinguishing its urinalysis scheme from those in earlier
special needs cases focused on the "scrutiny" placed on individuals. Justice
Ginsburg pointed to a "telling difference between Von Raab and Georgia's candidate
drug-testing program." ' Von Raab's Service employees created an invisible
danger because their "'work product' was not subjected to "'day-to-day
scrutiny."'"3 In contrast, Chandler's candidates for public office were subjected
to "relentless scrutiny - by their peers, the public, and the press," and so urinalysis
was simply not needed.3'
On this issue of oversight, Ferguson's doctors are much closer to sharing the
disadvantage suffered by employers in Von Raab than the easy access enjoyed by
Chandler's peers, press, and public. MUSC's physicians could not be at their
patient's bedside at all times. These mothers were adults, free to pursue any activity
they chose once outside the hospital. The doctors could only prescribe medication
and offer guidance during the long, nine-month gestation period. They necessarily
relied on their patients' own sense of responsibility to follow medical advice during
the time between visits. Further, the dangers caused by maternal drug use were even
less visible than the outward acts committed by Customs agents. The damage being
caused in Ferguson was hidden inside the human body, carried out with each beat
of the heart carrying drugs to the fetus. Chandler's "relentless scrutiny" protection
was just not available in Ferguson.
Had the Ferguson Court followed the balancing analysis that it repeatedly applied
in its own special needs precedent, it would have reached a holding 180 degrees
opposite of its actual conclusion. The Court's failure to adhere to its own balancing
rules, without a candid admission of its change in course, will ultimately create
confusion as to when and how courts should apply special needs. Ferguson
attempted to cover this gap in its analysis with a new fig leaf it labeled "law
enforcement purpose." As will be seen, this exercise in sophistry caused its own
troubles.
B. In Avoiding Special Needs Precedent, Ferguson Distinguished Earlier Special
Needs Cases Based on the Nonexistent Difference of "Law Enforcement Purpose"
The Justices in Ferguson, like doctors confronted with the latest victim of a
spreading epidemic, were alarmed by the degree of contagion spread in the name
of special needs. Justice Stevens acknowledged the severity of the most recent
illness, noting that "the invasion of privacy in this case is far more substantial" than
in prior special needs cases." Perhaps coming to grips, on some level, with the
notion that the danger currently facing the Fourth Amendment was doctor-induced,
the Court backed-off from prescribing the usual dose of special needs.
337. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
338. Id. (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989)).
339. Id.
340. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
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In doing so, however, the Court still lacked the nerve to reject outright its
previous course of special needs treatment. Instead of admitting the failure of the
special needs doctrine, Ferguson hoped to avoid its effects by distinguishing the
current case from earlier precedent. Because the four special needs cases involving
urinalysis were directly relevant to MUSC's testing of expectant mothers, the Court's
need to detect differences turned Justice Stevens into an intellectual contortionist.
Justice Stevens gamely embarked on the dubious exercise of distinguishing
Ferguson from its predecessors by contending that the earlier cases had a "critical
difference" from Ferguson in that those cases possessed a special need "divorced
from the State's general interest in law enforcement."" However, T.LO, the first
case to explicitly use the "special needs" rubric upon which all four later cases rely,
failed to make Ferguson's stark demarcation. The law-enforcement-versus-other-
government-needs distinction would have been lost on Mr. Theodore Choplick in
T.L.O., for he felt no compunction in immediately involving police upon discovery
of his student's marijuana. " Other officials in T.LO. also misunderstood the
purpose of the school's search, for the fruits of Mr. Choplick's intrusion triggered
delinquency charges against T.LO.3 Even Justice White, who crafted the opinion
in T.LO., demonstrated a failure to separate law enforcement cases from other
government activity.' In supporting its abandonment of the probable cause
requirement, the T.LO. Court relied on "a number of cases" in which "the legality
of searches and seizures [were] based on suspicions that, although 'reasonable,' [did]
not rise to the level of probable cause."" 5 One of these cases was Terry v. Ohio,
the seminal case allowing officers to pat-down persons reasonably suspected of
criminal activity.'
Skinner, the first of the four cases from which the Court aimed to distance
Ferguson, did not speak of a need to eliminate any and all connection to law
enforcement. Rather, it saw operating railroads as involving an additional need
"beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant
and probable-cause requirements."' Thus, Justice Kennedy likened Skinner not
only to the government's "operation of a school, or prison," but also to "its
supervision of probationers."' The Skinner Court's reference to probationers, and
its consequent citation to Griffin, was quite revealing, for Griffin was openly and
directly connected with law enforcement. In Griffin, both probation and police
officers directly searched the probationer.' Of particular interest, in light of the
Court's later conclusions in Ferguson, the officers in Griffin operated without any
pretense of consent, showing up to the door of the probationer's apartment and
341. Id. at 79.
342. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
343. Id. at 328-29.
344. Id. at 341-42.
345. Id. at 341.
346. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968).
347. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (emphasis added).
348. Id.
349. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868. 871 (1987).
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informing him that they "were going to search his home.""35 " The apparent purpose
of the search in Griffin was at least in part connected to law enforcement, for the
probationer was "charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, which
is itself a felony."3 ' Indeed, the prosecutor in Griffin used the evidence found by
the officers' search during the probationer's trial.352
In Griffin, probation's direct connection with law enforcement did not faze Justice
Scalia. He declared openly that "[pirobation, like incarceration, is 'a form of
criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after a verdict, finding, or
plea of guilty,"' and he characterized probation as "one of a set of points ... on a
continuum of possible punishments."3 3  The existence of law enforcement,
however, was not fatal to the special needs aspect of the government program.
Instead of acting as a poison pill, law enforcement involvement became part of a
larger, more sophisticated analysis of multiple variables. Probation might have been
punishment meted out by officers charged with "protecting the public interest,"'
but it also served "a period of genuine rehabilitation" for the probationer."' Thus,
the probation officer "is also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the
probationer" known as his "client."3 Indeed, Griffin did not banish the probation
officer from special needs simply because of the law enforcement aspect of the job.
Instead, the Court was able to recognize, within the dual nature of the probation
officer's role, a special needs aspect, allowing for a loosening of Fourth Amendment
standards.
A closer look at other cases Ferguson hoped to label as "divorced" from "law
enforcement" also tends to undermine the Court's all-or-nothing approach. A
comparison of Von Raab and Chandler creates particular difficulty for Ferguson.
In Von Raab, the Customs officers subject to drug tests were so enmeshed in
fighting crime that they were "targets of bribery by drug smugglers on numerous
occasions, and several [had] been removed from the Service for accepting bribes
and for other integrity violations." ' Despite Von Raab's purpose of fighting drug
crimes, Justice Kennedy still found a special need to justify urinalysis.35'
In Chandler, however, where officials were not "front-line" crime fighters, and
therefore further removed from law enforcement involvement than Von Raab's
Customs agents, the Court found no special needs."' Justice Ginsburg noted an
interesting difference between the government officials in Von Raab and Chandler.
She noted that in Von Raab, "'[d]rug interdiction ha[d] become the agency's primary
350. Id.
351. Id. at 872.
352. Id. at 871-72.
353. Id. at 874 (quoting KILUNGER, supra note 37. at 14).
354. Id. at 876.
355. Id. at 875.
356. Id. at 876.
357. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669 (1989).
358. Id. at 679.
359. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 320-21 (1997).
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enforcement mission."'" Further, Customs officers, "'more than any other Federal
workers, are routinely exposed to the vast network of organized crime that is
inextricably tied to illegal drug use."'"' The candidates for public office in
Chandler, in contrast, had no such direct involvement with crime fighting. 2 Thus,
any need to test candidates was "in short ... symbolic, not 'special."'' " The mere
purpose to "set a good example" was insufficient to create a special need.'"
Instead of supporting Ferguson's current view of special needs, the Court's earlier
comparison of Von Raab and Chandler tends to undermine it. Thus, upon close
inspection, Ferguson's sharp division between law enforcement and other
government needs is quite blurred.
C. Ferguson's Novel "Purpose" Standard Poses New Dangers to Fourth
Amendment Freedoms
The Ferguson Court's injection of a "purpose" standard hopelessly confuses a
balancing test already suffering from uncertainty and malleability. Ferguson
managed to do what no previous Court could - cause the earlier special needs test
to appear straightforward by contrast. The Court's addition of a "purpose" element
to special needs resulted in two "cures" that will worsen the disease. First, the
consideration of purpose runs directly counter to the Court's earlier edict prohibiting
assessment of subjective motivation. Second, the purpose inquiry took a test that
the Court designed to be applied by laypersons outside of law enforcement, and
made it even more complicated by adding an entirely extra level of complexity.
1. Ferguson's "Purpose" Element Dredged Up the Previously Forbidden Con-
sideration of Subjective Motivation
When Justice Stevens placed Charleston's officials on the couch, he performed
a meticulous analysis, honing in on their "primary purpose" in drug testing
patients." Earlier, the Court had flatly rejected such an inquiry, while perhaps
diligent and well meaning, as not only outside the proper realm of Fourth
Amendment doctrine, but as essentially futile. Further, this explicit denunciation of
the relevance of subjective motivation to Fourth Amendment analysis occurred only
five years prior to Ferguson, in Whren v. United States.'
In Whren, plainclothes vice-squad officers, having probable cause to believe that
a motorist had violated three different traffic codes, seized the motorist's truck at a
red light." As a result of the traffic stop, police "immediately observed," and
therefore recovered, crack cocaine from Whren's hands." Whren acknowledged
360. Id. at 321 (alterations in original) (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660).
361. Id. (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1987)).
362. Id. at 321-22.
363. Id. at 322.
364. Id.
365. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80 (2001).
366. 517 U.S. 806, 812-15 (1996).
367. Id. at 808-09.
368. Id. at 809.
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that -the police did indeed have probable cause to believe that he had violated traffic
laws. " ' He argued, however, that the officers had still violated the Fourth
Amendment in his case because the officers had based their decision to perform the
traffic stop on "impermissible factors." ''
Justice Scalia, in delivering the opinion of the Court, did not mince words in
rejecting the defendant's pretext argument. He declared, "Not only have we never
held . . . that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under
the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary." ''
This announcement, however absolute, was not enough for Justice Scalia, who
continued to flog the horse by reiterating that "'[s]ubjective intent alone . . . does
not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional."'' " Moreover, of
particular interest to Ferguson, the Whren Court singled out the determination of
group intent for special derision. Justice Scalia surmised, "It seems to us somewhat
easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the collective
consciousness of law enforcement .. . .,, Additionally, focus on a particular
department's practices would cause inconsistent application of Fourth Amendment
rights.374 Whren noted that "police enforcement practices, even if they could be
practicably assessed by a judge, vary from place to place and from time to time.
We cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment
are so variable, and can be made to turn upon such trivialities.0
7
5
None of these concerns, however, prevented the Ferguson Court from feeling the
bumps on the hospital staffers' heads.76 Justice Stevens openly discussed the
contents of officials' minds, speculating that "the threat of law enforcement may
ultimately have been intended as a means to an end, but the direct and primary
purpose of MUSC's policy was to ensure the use of those means."3" This kind of
divination of intent, whether of "ultimate," "primary," or "direct" intent, was exactly
the practice that Whren forbade in mandating that courts focus only on objective
behavior when assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
Ferguson's detour into subjective motivation caused the Court to wander into
discussions that it seemed to itself deem irrelevant. Justice Stevens rejected the
MUSC administrators' interpretation of their own thoughts by characterizing them
as merely the parroting of an empty platitude.37' He noted that Charleston officials
contended "in essence that their ultimate purpose - namely, protecting the health
369. Id. at 810.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 812.
372. Id. at 813 (alterations in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
373. Id. at 815.
374. Id.
375. Id. (citations omitted).
376. The feeling of "bumps" on "heads" is a reference to the "pseudo-science of phrenology" popular
in the 1800s. Phrenologists believed they could find evidence of a person's "brain functions" by
observing his "cranial features." Pierre Schlag, Commentary: Law and Phrenology, I 10 HARV. L. REV.
877, 878 (1997).
377. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83-84 (2001).
378. Id. at 80-82.
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of both mother and child - is a beneficent one."3" Justice Stevens, however,
cautioned that, in the past, the Court "did not simply accept the State's invocation
of a 'special need,"' instead it carried out a 'close review' of the scheme at
issue."" ' Later, Ferguson even more plainly equated motivation with irrelevancy.
The Court recognized that "respondents have repeatedly insisted [that] their motive
was benign rather than punitive. Such a motive, however, cannot justify a departure
from Fourth Amendment protections ... ."'" Thus, the new signal from the Court
seems to be that subjective motivation is relevant - unless the Court says that it
is not.
Pondering the inner thoughts of officials poses dangers to the Fourth Amendment,
for it distances the Court from the concrete protections afforded in objective reality.
Indeed, picking and choosing some subjective motivations over others removes any
certainty from special needs. Ferguson thus makes a malleable test all the more
vulnerable to manipulation by future courts.
2. Ferguson Has Further Complicated and Confused an Already Unwieldy
Special Needs Rule
In distinguishing special needs precedent, Ferguson designated government
"purpose" as the determinative question regarding Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. However, as noted above, the Court did not deem every thought in
a government official's head worthy of scrutiny. Instead, the Court found only the
"primary purpose" to be of constitutional relevance. In fact, Ferguson's "purpose"
inquiry required such precision that no earlier Court seemed to get it right. Von
Raab apparently stumbled when it spoke of a "public interest" that demanded
"effective measures to bar drug users from positions directly involving the
interdiction of illegal drugs,""3 2 and when it recognized the Custom Service's goal
in defending against "'the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by
smuggling of illicit narcotics."3 3 Such language certainly smacks of ultimate
purposes. The Court in Acton was an even worse offender. In Acton, Justice Scalia
committed the ultimate faux pas in Ferguson's eyes by deeming the government's
concern as "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren."' The Ferguson
Court must have viewed Justice Scalia as a bull in a china shop when he
characterized Von Raab's "governmental concern" as "enhancing efficient
enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs," and must have
further shuddered when he declared Skinner's government interest as "deterring drug
use by engineers and trainmen.""3 '
Despite such prior lapses, the Ferguson Court now plunged into "purpose" as its
only hope to distinguish MUSC's testing from its special needs precedent. As a
379. Id. at 81.
380. Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997)).
381. Id. at 85.
382. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989).
383. Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
384. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995).
385. Id.
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result, the Court's latest refinement of special needs balancing created an intricate
and subtle test applicable by only the most seasoned Fourth Amendment scholars.
The current balancing test's complexity stems from the Court's apparent fear to
accept that elements of its special needs rule could be flawed. Thus, the Court
attempted to fix a bad rule by attaching even more elements to it, instead of
reexamining the propriety of the original special needs doctrine. The result of the
Court's ad hoc construction is a curious amalgam of tests essentially knitted together
from its three latest cases. The Court has thus burdened special needs with a rule
built of parts within parts and terms understood only by nuanced definitions.
Ironically, special needs was born in part due to the Court's hope of simplifying
the lives of officials called upon to employ it. In T.LO., the Court respected that
a school's capacity to maintain "security and order" required "a certain degree of
flexibility in school disciplinary procedures" and the ability to preserve "the
informality of the student-teacher relationship."' Consequently, the Court aimed
to craft a simple "reasonableness" balancing test, which would "neither unduly
burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools nor
authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren."3 "7 The goal
was to offer faculty, who were laypersons in the law, a simpler alternative to the
complicated rules that guided police. " Justice White believed that "[bjy focusing
attention on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and
school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of
probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates
of reason and common sense.""'
Instead of relieving officials of the niceties of probable cause, the Court merely
replaced these niceties with a different set for special needs. Consider how special
needs evolved by the time of Acton into a three-factor test, complete with subparts
under each element. In Acton, Justice Scalia moved beyond a simple balance of
government versus individual interests to the following multipronged test:
(1) Decreased expectation of privacy:
(a) the context in which privacy expectations are asserted;
and
(b) the individual's relationship with the State.
(2) The relative unobtrusiveness of the search:
(a) the manner of the search; and
(b) the content of information revealed by the search.
(3) The severity of the need met by the search:
(a) the nature of the governmental concern;
(b) the immediacy of the governmental concern; and
386. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985).
387. Id. at 342-43.
388. Id. at 343.
389. Id.
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(c) the efficacy of the means for meeting the governmental
concern.
3
90
Chandler, however, refined this balancing test still further by setting up a
triggering mechanism that a party must satisfy before he can employ the balancing
test in the drug-testing context." Chandler identified the triggering factor as the
following: "[T]he proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial -
important enough to override the' individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individualized suspicion."" Thus, the special need was special not because it was
different in kind (as a need outside of law enforcement), but because it was special
in degree (as being "important").3 3 Further, this special need could be "shore[dJ
up" by a "demonstrated problem of drug abuse. '
In Chandler, Justice Ginsburg also tweaked some of Acton's elements.
Specifically, she altered Acton's prong (1)(a), which considered the context in which
an individual asserted his privacy expectations. 9 ' Typically, reduced privacy
expectations likewise reduced an individual's interests in special needs balancing.'
However, Chandler noted that a reduced expectation of privacy in the context of
public office could create the exact opposite effect, actually increasing the
individual's rights under special needs. 7
Justice Ginsburg also fine-tuned Acton's prong (2)(a), which, in weighing the
unobtrusiveness of the search, considered the manner in which the search
occurred. Under Acton, the only concern expressed was that the search not be
unduly intrusive." ' Indeed, the Acton Court was put at ease by finding that school
officials did not directly observe the children while they provided a urine
sample." Chandler then created a limitation on the other end of the spectrum,
nullifying testing schemes that were not intrusive enough.*" Thus, Justice
Ginsburg faulted Georgia's testing for failing to deter drug users by enabling them
to temporarily abstain before known testing dates."
Ferguson adds still more complexity to special needs' Byzantine rules. Justice
Stevens' "purpose" element apparently fits into Acton's prong (3)(a), the nature of
the governmental concern. Here, the government actor pursuing a particular special
390. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 654-64.
391. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 317-19 (1997).
392. Id. at 318.
393. Id. at 318-19.
394. Id. at 319.
395. Id. at 321.
396. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656-57 (1995).
397. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318-19.
398. Id. at 319-20.
399. Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
400. Id. In this respect, the Court was careful to note that boys remained fully clothed and were
observed only from behind, while girls produced samples while sitting inside stalls. Id.
401. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319-20.
402. Id.
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needs program would have to stop for some self-assessment, inquiring, "What is our
purpose in performing this search?" Of course, this oversimplifies the analysis, for
the official would have to identify the government's "programmatic purpose.""' 3
Moreover, not just any programmatic purpose will do; the government employee
must locate the "primary" purpose and distinguish it from any "ultimate" pur-
pose."' Only with this primary, programmatic purpose in mind will the State be
able to properly assess one of three subparts to a three-element balancing test.
While wading through this mess, at least officialdom can find solace in the fact that
T.L.O. relieved it of the burden of considering the "common-sense" 5 standard of
probable cause."
The tortured special needs test that the Court created in Acton, Chandler, and
Ferguson is the very kind of rule that the Court once openly criticized. In New York
v. Belton,' where the Court crafted an easily applied bright-line test for searches
incident to arrest for automobiles, Justice Stewart spoke of the importance of
simplicity. Although the Court meant for the rule advanced in Belton to guide
police officers in the field, the case's call for clarity resonates all the more for rules
designed for lay persons. Justice Stewart admonished,
Fourth Amendment doctrine ... is primarily intended to regulate the
police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in
terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law
enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly
sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may
be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and
judges eagerly feed, but they may be "literally impossible of application
by the officer in the field."4 '
Special needs, thanks to Ferguson, is now encumbered with such sophistication,
nuance, and hairline distinctions. This complexity is all the more alarming when one
recalls that special needs began as a vehicle to free teachers, lay persons at the law,
from the complicated "niceties" of probable cause." s Ironically, in contrast to
special needs, the Court currently sees probable cause as nothing more than a
403. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001).
404. Id. at 82-84.
405. The Court had previously simplified probable cause into a "common-sense" standard that
officials could easily apply in the haste of criminal investigations. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235-36
(1983).
406. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
407. 453 U.S. 454 (1980).
408. Id. at 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Cave-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized
Procedures"; The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. Cr. REV. 127, 141).
409. The T.L.O. Court reasoned, "By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the
standard will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of common
sense." T.LO., 469 U.S. at 343.
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"practical, nontechnical conception.""" Probable cause merely involves "factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act."" The Court, in treating cases with the special needs remedy
of its own creation, has strayed ever farther from a Constitutional fundamental that
required officials to answer, at most, a "commonsense, practical question.",
4
1
2
Ferguson's intricate special needs analysis is reminiscent of the nineteenth century
discipline of phrenology, which "was devoted to the identification of basic brain
functions and their manifestations in cranial features."" Dr. Franz Joseph Gall,
the founder of phrenology, "wished to transform the study of brain functions, then
called psychology, into a science. Above all, Gall believed that he had to rescue this
nascent field from the conjectures and constructions of metaphysicians and
speculative philosophers.""' Gall therefore constructed a discipline that "developed
into an intricate multi-layered field," which struggled to identify and classify such
subtle concepts as "fundamental faculties.""' Phrenology blossomed into a highly
regarded science, complete with scholarly journals and crowded lectures."' Only
one problem existed for phrenology: it lacked any basis in fact."7 Phrenology
might have been very beneficial to its adherents; the patients of those practitioners
might not have been so lucky.
In the doctrine of special needs, the Court may have found its own legal version
of phrenology. Created by the highest court in the nation and repeatedly expanded
in a series of opinions, special needs is offered by those with prestige and power.
However, it too has a fundamental flaw: it lacks any basis in the text of the Fourth
Amendment. While the Court comforts itself with intricate formulas and added
elements, Fourth Amendment privacy, the patient in need of care, wastes away.
V. Conclusion
In 1971, Dr. Arthur DeVoe, "an eye surgeon and chairman of the department of
ophthalmology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University,"
diagnosed a fifty-five-year-old female patient as having a disease requiring a corneal
transplant."' As a cure, Dr. DeVoe transplanted a cornea from a donor whose later
autopsy "showed the characteristic damage of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease," a human
brain disease analogous to bovine spongiform encephalopathy ("mad cow"
disease)."9 As a result of the operation, the patient's eye healed, and she could see
410. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 230.
413. Schlag, supra note 376, at 878.
414. Id. at 878-79.
415. Id. at 882.
416. Id. at 877.
417. Id. at 886-87.
418. RICHARD RHODES, DEADLY FEASTS: THE "PRION" CONTROVERSY AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH
131 (1998).
419. Id. at 132-33.
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clearly through the donor's cornea."' However, one-and-a-half years later, the
patient "began feeling nauseated, had difficulty swallowing," and ultimately
degenerated into a vegetative state, ending in death."'" An autopsy revealed
damage to her brain similar to that of the cornea donor."' Here, the doctor's
treatment was successful in that it met its objective to correct his patient's vision.
Yet, in righting one wrong, the surgeon inadvertently created a much worse
problem.
In cases such as T.L.O. and Skinner, the Court invented special needs to remedy
the conflicts between individual privacy and valid public concerns. Although its
new therapy lacked any explicit basis in the Fourth Amendment's text, the Court felt
special needs was merited in light of new situations occurring that were beyond the
Framers' imaginations.'" In their attempt to refine the Framers' original prescrip-
tion, the Justices injected more than just special needs into the Fourth Amendment.
The Court inadvertently infected the patient with a test so malleable that Justices
could use the same fact, such as exposure to public scrutiny, to both bolster and
attack a government program. Further, the new treatment spawned a reasonableness
balancing that became so complicated that it itself defied reason.
To its credit, the Ferguson Court recognized that it had lost control over its
special needs cure. Yet, rather than candidly reassess the efficacy of its treatment,
the Court simply tried to cover up its adverse side effects by applying the Band-Aid
of further refinements. Ferguson thus increased the virulence of special needs.
Now, the infecting agent, armed with the new element of "purpose," is so subjective
that it ultimately embraces as an element what the Court had previously criticized
as a dangerous and futile inquiry: the subjective intent of government. Moreover,
the purpose analysis, in adding a new analytical layer, guarantees new complexity,
and thus confusion, in special needs.
Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz once quipped, "I often say a great doctor
kills more people than a great general."' Perhaps this is something the Court
should ponder before it next operates on the Fourth Amendment with its "special
needs" scalpel.
420. Id. at 132.
421. Id. at 133.
422. Id.
423. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).
424. JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 315 (15th ed. 1980).
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